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Abstract—Smart grid systems are composed of power and
communication network components. The components in either
network exhibit complex dependencies on components in its
own as well as the other network to drive their functionality.
Existing, models fail to capture these complex dependencies.
In this paper, we restrict to the dependencies in the power
network and propose the Multi-scale Implicative Interdependency
Relation (MIIR) model that address the existing limitations. A
formal description of the model along with its working dynamics
and a brief validation with respect to the 2011 Southwest blackout
are provided. Utilizing the MIIR model, the K Contingency List
problem is proposed. For a given time instant, the problem solves
for a set of K entities in a power network which when failed at
that time instant would cause the maximum number of entities
to fail eventually. Owing to the problem being NP-complete we
devised a Mixed Integer Program (MIP) to obtain the optimal
solution and a polynomial time sub-optimal heuristic. The efficacy
of the heuristic with respect to the MIP is compared by using
different bus system data. In general, the heuristic is shown to
provide near optimal solution at a much faster time than the
MIP.
Keywords—MIIR model, Power Network, Cascading failure,
Mixed Integer Program, Heuristic, Contingency List.
I. INTRODUCTION
The smart grid system constitutes both Power and Commu-
nication entities to execute different tasks and can be modeled
as an interdependent Power-Communication network. Consider
entities in either network. The electricity generation and power
flows are partially controlled by the Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition System (SCADA) through signals received
from Remote Terminal Units (RTUs). Meanwhile, every entity
involved in sensing, sending and controlling the power grid
(i.e. the Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs)) are dependent
on power network entities to drive their functions. Owing to
these dependencies, failure of some entities in either network
may eventually result in a cascading failure causing widespread
power blackouts.
In this article, we restrict to the analysis of cascading
failure in smart grids considering power network dependencies
in isolation. Consider that the control centers are not prone
to cyber-attacks/physical failures and have additional power
backup (independent of the underlying power grid) to make
them operational under all circumstances. Even with such an
assumption, studying the power network dependencies would
provide potential information regarding the vulnerability and
reliability of the smart grid system. It is to be noted that
analysis under this assumption does bring into effect the
failure of PMUs. PMUs are directly dependent for power
on the associated power network entity. Hence failure of a
power network entity would make the associated PMU non-
operational. A brief description of the underlying analysis is
provided. The power network entities can be broadly cate-
gorized into – Generation Bus, Load Bus, Neutral Bus and
Transmission Lines. Consider a scenario in which there is
an initial trip of a transmission line. This would cause some
power to be re-routed through other lines to satisfy the load
demands. Occasionally, this may result in some transmission
lines to have power flow beyond their rated capacity limits
causing them to trip. A series/cascade of such line trips might
eventually cause a blackout. Regional power blackouts caused
by cascading failure of components in power network have
been seen previously in New York (2003) [1], San Diego
(2011) [2] and India (2012) [3]. From a system operator’s
point of view, understanding the vulnerable components in the
power network is critical to making well-judged decisions for
prevention of power failure. An abstract model that captures
these dependencies and an algorithm that uses this model to
identify the critical components fast is beneficial from the
operator’s point of view.
For the last few years, there has been a considerable surge of
research being done in studying the complex dependencies in
different critical infrastructures that cause cascading failures.
Existing literature relies mostly on graph based models to
represent the dependencies [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10].
These models, however, fail to capture the complex depen-
dencies that might exist which limits their applicability to real
world systems. Authors in [11] bring out the need to address
the complex dependencies in an inter-dependent or intra-
dependent critical infrastructure(s) which can be explained
through the following example. Let ex, ew, ey, ez (which can
be a generator, substation, transmission line etc.) be power
network entities. Consider the dependency where the entity
ex is operational if (i) entities ew and (logical AND) ey
are operational, or (logical OR) (ii) entity ez is operational.
Models in [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [12] fails to capture
this kind of dependency. Motivated by these findings and
limitations of the existing models, the authors in [11] proposed
a Boolean logic based dependency model termed as Implicative
Interdependency Model (IIM). For the example stated above,
the dependency of ex on ew, ey, ez can be represented as
ex ← ew · ey + ez . This equation representing the dependency
of an entity is termed as Interdependency Relation (IDR).
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2The biggest challenge of the IIM formulation is the identifi-
cation of the dependency relations between the different enti-
ties. In the past, this was done based on information obtained
from subject matter experts. However, it has now become
clear that this is not a very reliable procedure. The second
problem is that IIM operates on Boolean logic, implying that
the different entities can only have two values — 0 or 1,
representing the state of the entity being operational or non-
operational. However, this does not provide information about
entities which are operating at near-failure state. For example,
consider a generator that is operational but operating at 95% of
its peak generation capacity. The IIM model only provides the
state of the generator (operational or non-operational). Hence
the operator won’t be alerted even though the generator is
reaching its peak generation capacity (which might eventually
fail due to over generation). Thus, such scenarios limits the
applicability of the IIM model.
In order to overcome the limitations of IIM and to extend the
application domain of IDRs for long-term planning and short-
term operational management, the Multi-scale Implicative In-
terdependency Relation (MIIR) model is proposed. The MIIR
model uses the notion of IDRs with added features to capture
the power flow in transmission lines and demand/generation of
buses. PMU data is used to generate the dependency equations
as well as obtaining power flow and demand/generation values.
Using the MIIR model we study the K contingency list
problem in this paper. At a given time t the problem solves
for a set of K components in the power network which when
made non-operational at time t would cause the maximum
number of entities to fail. Additionally, the solution would
provide insights into components which are operating at their
near capacity limits. Such a solution would have an immediate
benefit to a system operator making decisions at that time to
prevent large-scale power failures.
The paper is segregated as follows. In Section III, we
describe the MIIR model in details and its applicability through
a case study of real world power failure. The K contingency
list problem and its computational complexity are detailed out
in Section IV. Owing to the problem being NP-complete, a
mixed integer program is provided that solves the problem
optimally in Section V. As it is critical to solving the problem
fast, a sub-optimal heuristic with polynomial time complexity
is discussed in the same section. A detailed experimental
analysis for different bus systems is provided in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
The Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructures, ap-
pointed by President Clinton in 1996 [13], was one of the ear-
liest studies done on understanding robustness and resiliency
of Critical Infrastructure Interdependency. Rinaldi et al.[14],
[15] are among the first group of researchers to study the
inter-dependency between critical infrastructures and proposed
a complex adaptive system to model the inter-dependencies. A
survey of Critical Infrastructure Interdependency modeling is
presented in Pederson et al. in [16] which was undertaken by
the U.S and a group of international researchers. As discussed
before, there have been significant research to capture these
inter-dependencies using graph-based models [4], [5], [6],
[7], [8], [9], [10]. In general, the abstractions provided by
the graph-based models fail to capture the complex inter-
dependencies that might exist.
An event driven co-simulation framework for interdependent
power-communication network was presented by Lin et al. in
[17], [18]. The authors in [12] presented a game theoretic
model for a multi-layer infrastructure networks using flow
equilibrium. Authors in [19] studied the security of inter-
dependent and identical Networked Control System (NCS).
They used a discrete-time stochastic linear system to model
each plant with a shared communication network controlling
the systems. In [20] the importance of considering power
and communication infrastructures simultaneously was high-
lighted. Based on the Polish power grid blackout, a study of
the impact of overhead lines tripping order on the severity of
failure is presented in [21]. Analyzing failure in the smart grid
under targeted initial attack was studied in [22]. The effect of
cyber (communication) and power network dependencies in
the smart grid was studied in [23] for reliability assessments.
Recovery of information of the failed entities in a power
grid after a failure event was studied in [24]. Topology based
vulnerability assessment in power netowkr has been reported in
[25], [26], [27]. As we rely on PMU data of the power network
for generating the dependency equations, we investigated the
current status of utilizing PMU data in addressing the complex
inter-dependency issues. The roles of real-time measurements
obtained from IEDs such as PMUs in mitigating failures have
been investigated in [28], [29], [30], [31]. However, most of
the analysis in these papers does not gives insight about the
instantaneous identification of most vulnerable entities in a
power network.
III. THE MIIR MODEL
In this paper, the MIIR model is developed based on the
power network. It is aimed to have a near accurate abstraction
of the power flow dynamics and capture cascading failure prop-
agation in the same. It is to be noted with proper modification
the model has the potential to be extended for performing
a similar analysis in different inter/intra-dependent critical
infrastructure system(s).
A. Model Variables
We consider load buses, generator buses, neutral buses (or
zero injection buses) and transmission lines as different types
of entities. Let E = {e1, e2, . . . , en} denote the set of entities
in the power network. Each entity ei ∈ E has three values asso-
ciated with it — (i) a lower bound ei,l, (ii) an upper bound ei,u,
and (iii) the instantaneous power value ei,c,t at time t of the
entity. For a transmission line type entity ek, the value of ek,c,t
provides the power flow in that line at time t. Corresponding,
for a load bus em and generator bus en the values em,c,t and
en,c,t provides the load demand and generating value at time
t. For the power transmission and distribution systems, PMU
data can be used to get the instantaneous power value ei,c,t of
the entity ei. The values of ei,l and ei,u can be easily obtained
from the entity rating data. For a given time t the state of the
entity is still Boolean (operational or not operational) and is
guided by the following two factors — (a) ei,c,t satisfies the
property ei,l < ei,c,t < ei,u, (b) the corresponding dependency
equation of ei at time t is satisfied. Hence, if ei has an IDR
ei ← ej · ek + el then for ei to be operational both the
properties — (a) (ei and ek) or el is operational at t − δ,
and (b) ei,t ≤ ei,c,t ≤ ei,u has to be satisfied. Here δ refers
to the time within which the effect of failure of an entity
3is propagated to its dependent entity. So using MIIR model
the power network at time t is mathematically represented as
P (E,B,Ct, F ) where E is the set of of entities, B is a set of
tuples {ei,l, ei,u} (∀ei ∈ E) denoting the power value bound
on the entity, Ct consist of instantaneous power value ei,c,t
(∀ei ∈ E) at time t and F contains the set of dependency
equations for the entities in E. A similar notation has been
used in [26] but our notation brings out a completely different
topological aspect of the power network.
B. Generating and Obtaining the Sets B,Ct and F for a
Power Network
We illustrate our strategy to generate the dependency equa-
tions F and the set Ct of a power network P (E,B,Ct, F ) at
a given time t. The PMU data is substituted with simulated
data due to its unavailability for different bus systems. The
MATPOWER [32] software is used to generate the simulated
data. For a given time t and a standard bus system (containing
a set of buses and transmission lines E), the software use load
demand of the bus, the impedance of the transmission lines etc.
to solve the power flow. The software produces the voltage of
each bus in the system as the output. The software suite also
includes a wide range of bus systems along with power ratings
of the components for all such systems. We restrict ourselves
to analyze the real power flow. Firstly, for a given solution,
we formally state the procedure to obtain the tuple values of
the set B and instantaneous power value contained in the set
C (all values in MW) for generator buses, load buses, neutral
buses and transmission lines —
• Generator Bus: The real part of the power generated
is taken as the value of ea,c,t for a generator bus
ea ∈ E. The upper bound ea,u is set to its real generation
capacity (supplied in the MATPOWER suite) and the
lower bound ea,l is set to 0. It is to be noted that
some generator buses have load demand. Consider ex
be a generator bus with load demand d units and real
instantaneous power generated ex,c,t units. Without the
loss of generality, such a bus is split into a generator bus
ex1 with 0 load demand (instantaneous power generated
ex1,c,t) and a load bus ex2 with instantaneous load
demand d units (instantaneous power generated 0). A
transmission line ex12 is constructed that connects ex1 to
ex2 with an instantaneous power flow of d units flowing
from ex1 to ex2.
• Load Bus: The real part of the load demand is taken as
instantaneous demand value eb,c,t of a load bus eb ∈ E.
For a load bus eb, both its upper and lower bound is
set to the instantaneous demand value eb,c,t. Essentially,
our assumption is that a load bus does not change its
demand value irrespective of any failure.
• Neutral Bus: For a netrual bus ed ∈ E the values of
ed,l, ed,u and ed,c,t are set to 0.
• Transmission Lines: For two buses e1 and e2 connected
by a transmission line e12 the power flowing through
the transmission line is calculated as P12 = Real(V1 ∗
(V1−V−2I12 )
∗), where V1 is the voltage at bus e1, V2
is the voltage at bus e2 (V1 and V2 returned by the
MATPOWER solver) and I12 is the impedance of the
transmission line e12 (obtained from the supplied bus
system file of MatPower). P12 is the real component of
the power flowing in the transmission line e12. The lower
bound is set to 0 and the upper bound is taken as the
rated capacity of the transmission line. The instantaneous
power value e12,c,t is set to |P12| (absolute value).
Fig. 1: A 9 bus power network system with flow, demand, and
generation values at an arbitrary time instant t
The description of the transmission line type entity provided
above shows that power flows from bus e1 to e2 if P12 is
positive and vice versa otherwise. As a result, we can interpret
the direction of power flow in the line from the solution
which we obtained from MatPower. We use this solution to
generate the set F which is the set of dependency equations.
As an example, we consider the nine bus system which is
shown in Figure 1. This figure describes a power network
P (E,B,Ct, F ), at time instance t with E being the set of
entities containing generator buses from G1 to G3, load buses
L1 to L4, neutral buses {N1, N2} and transmission lines
T1 through T9. The figure also provides the instantaneous
power values by solving the power network flow based on
demand/generation at some time instant t. The red blocks
denote the instantaneous real power generated by a generator,
the green blocks denote instantaneous real load demands and
the blue nodes are neutral. The values in the grey blocks
denote the flow of power in the transmission lines with the
arrows denoting the direction of power flow. There aren’t
any IDRs for the transmission lines. The IDRs for bus b1
is created as follows: (a) let b2, b3 be the buses and b12
(between b1 and b2) and b13 between (b1 and b3) be the
transmission lines for which power flows from these buses to
b1, (b) the dependency equation for the bus b1 is constructed as
disjunction of minterms of size 2 (this consists of the bus from
which the power is flowing and the respective transmission
line) with each disjunction corresponding to buses from which
power is flowing to it. For this example the dependency
equation b1 ← b12b2 + b13b3 is created. Using this definition,
the dependency equations for the buses in Figure 1 are as
follows — (a) L1 ← T1 · G1 , (b) L2 ← T2 · L1 + T7 · N2,
(c) L3 ← T3 · L1 + T4 ·N1, (d) L4 ← T6 ·N1 + T8 ·N2, (e)
N1 ← T5 ·G3, (f) N2 ← T9 ·G2.
C. Dynamics of the MIIR model
To understand the dynamics of cascading failure in power
network based on the MIIR model we first create the abstract
representation P (E,B,C0, F ) (which is constructed using
technique discussed in Section III-B) for a power network at
time t = 0. An event of initial failure is assumed to occur
at time t = 0 with failure cascade propagating in unit time
steps. For an entity that is operational at time step t = τ the
4following equations are required to be satisfied —∑
em∈Oeg
em,c,τ =
∑
en∈Ieg
en,c,τ + eg,c,τ ,∀eg ∈ G (1)
∑
em∈Oel
em,c,τ =
∑
en∈Iel
en,c,τ − el,c,τ ,∀el ∈ L (2)
∑
em∈Oek
em,c,τ =
∑
en∈Iek
en,c,τ + ek,c,τ ,∀ek ∈ N (3)
Equations 1-3 dictates the law of conservation of energy for
each bus in the system. We assume that there is no delay in
time between the power flowing out from a bus and power
flowing into it.
In equation 1, the transmission line entities that flows power
out and into the generator bus eg (where G ⊂ E contains
all generator buses) are represented by sets Ieg and Oeg
respectively. Equation 2 and 3 uses the same notations of
transmission line for load bus el (where L ⊂ E contains
all load buses) and neutral bus ek (where N ⊂ E contains
all neutral buses) respectively. In Equation 3, the value of
ek,c,t = 0 for all time steps and hence it can be simpli-
fied as
∑
em∈Iek em,c,t =
∑
en∈Oek en,c,t. Additionally, for
a generator bus there is no power injected to it through
transmission lines. Hence equation 1 can be re-written as∑
em∈Ieg em,c,t = eg,c,t,∀eg ∈ G. We use this abstract
representation of the power network i.e. P (E,B,C0, F ) at
time t = 0. Using this the cascading failure process of the
power network on an event of initial failure of E′ ⊂ E at time
step t = 0 is detailed out in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Algorithm describing the failure cascading
process in power network using MIIR model
Data: A power network P (E,B,C0, F ) at time t = 0 and a
set of initially failing entities E′ ⊂ E
Result: A set of failed entities S
1 begin
2 Initialize S ← E′, size← 0 ;
3 Increment t← t+ 1 ;
4 while size 6= |S| do
5 Set size← |S|;
6 Kill all entities whose dependency equations are not
satisfied and add them to set S;
7 Adjust power flow values ek,c,t of transmission line
entities ek and generating values eg,c,t of generator
buses eg such that Equations 1 -3 are satisfied.;
8 Kill all entities whose bounds are not satisfied and add
them to set S ;
9 Increment t← t+ 1 ;
10 return S ;
In Algorithm 1, at every iteration the flow values are
adjusted based on Equations 1-3 at line 8 and entities are made
non-operational based on the two conditions mentioned at lines
7 and 9. The cascading process continues if a new entities fail
in the previous time step (condition size 6= |S|). As evident
we assume that there is a delay of 1 time unit for an entity
to become non operational if its dependency equations are
unsatisfied. All entities whose bound values are not satisfied
are made non operational at that time step after power flow
calculation. It is to be noted that the dependency equations are
generated from a graph which is directed acyclic. Owing to this
property the cascade reaches a steady (no new entities are non-
operational) within O(|E|) times steps. This can be explained
as follows. Consider a single initial failure of an entity. If no
entity fails the cascading algorithm would continue till at most
|E| − 1 time steps since the maximum distance between two
nodes in a directed acyclic graph is |E| − 1 (considering each
edge having a weight 1). If more than one entity fails then the
cascade is expected to stop before |E| − 1. Hence the number
of cascading time steps is strictly upper bounded by |E| − 1.
Algorithm 1 assumes that there exist a method to compute
the flow value equations to get the instantaneous power values
of entities. This is equivalent to computing the AC power
flow equations again (using MatPower) which would be time
intensive and does not make use of the abstraction created
by the MIIR model to make any decision. Moreover, using
general graph theoretical algorithmic techniques might result in
multiple solutions of instantaneous power values when solving
a given set of power flow equations thus resulting in ambiguity.
To counteract this, in our abstraction, we use the notion of
Worst-Case Cascade Propagation (WCCP) in Algorithm
1. Qualitatively, the instantaneous value of power flows and
power generator at every time step t > 0 of the cascade is set
to a value that would cause the maximum number of entities to
fail at the end of the cascade. Computation of this power flow
values using WCCP is proved to be NP-complete in Section
IV. We devise a mixed integer porgram to get the optimal
solution and a greedy heuristic to get a sub-optimal solution
in polynomial time in Section V that addresses WCCP.
D. Case Study: The 2011 Southwest Blackout
In this subsection the performance of MIIR with WCCP
is tested on a real power system event: the 2011 Southwest
Blackout. All data used in this analysis are obtained from [2].
An abstraction of the Southwest Power System is provided
in Figure 2. The abbreviations used in Figure 2 are —
Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC), Serrano
(SE), Devers (DE), San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
(SONGS), San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG & E), Miguel (MI),
Imperial Valley (IV), Imperial Irrigation District (IID), Comi-
sion Federal de Electricidad’s (CFE, corresponding to Baja
California Control Area), North Gila (NG), Hassayampa (HA),
Palo Verde (PV), and Western Area Power Administration-
Lower Colorado (WAPA). The blue, orange and green blocks
in Figure 2 represents neutral, load and generator buses respec-
tively. The transmission lines are labeled T1 − T17 with the
arrows indicating the directions of the pre-disturbance power
flows. On September 8, 2011, an initial trip of the HA-NG
transmission line (T11) caused blackout in SDG & E region.
The objective here is to see whether MIIR model with worst
case cascade propagation is able to capture the power outage.
The dependency equations in Table I without the bounds
and instantaneous power values of the entities (buses and
transmission lines) corresponds to the set F . Consider tripping
of the entity T11 at t = 0. Just considering the IDRs itself,
the component NG fails at t = 1, WALC and IV at t = 2,
CFE and MI at t = 3. The pre-disturbance load demands of
SDG&E and IID were approximately 5000 MW and 900 MW,
respectively, while the generation bounds on PV and WECC
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Fig. 2: An abstraction of the Southwest Power System
Dependency Equations
SE ← T1 ·WECC + T4 ·DE
DE ← T3 · PV + T2 ·WECC
SONGS ← T5 · SE
SDG&E ← T6 · SONGS + T7 ·MI
IID ← T8 ·DE + T15 ·WALC + T9 · IV
MI ← T12 · IV
IV ← T13 ·NG
CFE ← T14 · IV + T13 ·MI
WALC ← T16 ·NG
NG← T11 ·HA
HA← T10 · PV
TABLE I: IDRs of the Southwest Power System
were [0, 4000 MW] and [0, 10000 MW], respectively. After
failure of T11, SDG&E and IID would try to meet their bulk
load demands through the generator buses PV and WECC via
T6 and T8. The bound on T6 is [0, 2200 MW] and T8 is
[0, 1800 MW]. Both PV and WECC have enough generation
capacity to meet the load demand of SDG&E and IID. At
t = 3 owing to the load demand of SDG & E the transmission
line T6 would have try to have a power flow of 5000 MW
instantly. Thus T6 would trip at t = 3 causing SDG&E to trip
at t = 4. Owing to this the power flowing through T1, T4 and
T5 would reduce down to 0 at t = 4. The power flow in T8
would increase to 900 MW at t = 3 for supplying power to
IID. Thus the steady state is reached at t = 4 and MIIR model
accurately predicts the blackout of SDG & E region.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
It is important from a power system operator’s point of
view to understand and know the most critical entities in the
network at a given time. This would enable the operator to
make more reliable decisions on an event of some failure.
For larger systems, an automation that provides the operator
with this information would be hugely beneficial. Owing to
this we develop the K Contingency List (KCoL) problem
using MIIR model with WCCP. For a given time t and an
integer K the problem provides the operator with a list of
K entities which when failed initially causes the maximum
number of entities to fail at the steady state of cascade
propagation. Qualitatively, for a given integer K the problem
finds a set E′ (|E′| = K) entities which when failed initially
maximizes the total number of entities failed at the end of the
cascading process. A formal description of the KCoL problem
using WCCP of MIIR model for Power Network is provided —
Input: (a) A power network P (E,B,Ct, F ) where
E = G ∪ L ∪ N ∪ T . Set of entities G, L, N and T
are disjoint and contains the generator buses, load buses,
neutral buses and transmission lines respectively. (b) two
positive integers K and S.
Decision Version: Does there exist a set of K entities in E
whose failure at time t would result in a failure of at least S
entities in total at the end of the cascading process.
Optimization Version: Compute the a set K entities in a
power network P (E,B,Ct, F ) whose failure at time t would
maximize the number of entities failed at the steady state of
cascade propagation.
We prove the problem is NP-complete to solve in Theorem
1
Theorem 1. The KVNE problem using MIIRA model is NP-
complete.
Proof: The problem is proved to NP-complete by a
reduction from the densest p−subhypergraph problem [33]. An
instance of the densest p−subhypergraph problem consists of
a hypergraph H = (V,E) and two parameters p and M . The
decision version of the problem finds the answer to whether
there exists a set of vertices V ′ ⊂ V and |V ′| ≤ p which
completely covers at least M hyper-edges.
From an instance of the densest p−subhypergraph we create
an instance of the KCoL problem as follows. We start with an
empty set of entities G, L and T and an empty set F that would
comprise of the dependency equations. A load type entity Lj is
added to set L for each hyper-edge Ej ∈ E with instantaneous
load demand Li,c,t set to the number of vertices that comprise
this hyper-edge. For each vertex Vi ∈ V we add a generator
type entity Gi to set G. The upper bound on the capacity of
the generator Gi is set to the sum of all instantaneous load
demands Li,c,t + 1 for which the corresponding hyper-edge
Ej contains the vertex Vi. For each hyper-edge Ej consisting
of vertices Vx, Vy, Vz (say) three transmission line type entities
Tx, Ty and Tz are added to set T and a dependency equation
Lj ← Tx · Gx + Ty · Gy + Tz · Gz is created and added
to set F . The upper bound of the transmission line is set
to the load demand +1 of the entity it connects to (e.g., in
this case, the maximum capacity of each transmission line
Tx, Ty, Tz are set to the instantaneous load demand Li,c,t+1).
The parameter S of KCoL problem is set to p+M and K is
set to p (i.e. p entities fail at time t). Thus the created instance
satisfy the property of the graph from which the dependency
relations are computed being Directed Acyclic. In the initial
operating condition at time t, all transmission lines have a
line flow value of 1 unit with each generator Gi producing
Pi units of power, where Pi is the number of load entities it
is connected to. Hence all load demands are satisfied. It can
be directly followed that an instance of KCoL problem can be
created from an instance of densest p−subhypergraph problem
in polynomial time.
It is to be noted that for the created instance — (1) Each
transmission line has the capacity to satisfy the complete load
demand of the load type entity it is connecting, (ii) Each
generator has the capacity to satisfy the load demand of all
the load type entities it is connected to. Hence an initial
failure of one or more entities would not cause any trans-
mission line or generator to trip (fail) because of exceeding
6its maximum capacity. Thus the generators and transmission
lines are susceptible only to initial failure whereas the load
entities are vulnerable to both initial and induced failures.
However, failure of load entities can not cause any induced
failure. Induced failure of the load entity can be caused only
when each minterm in its dependency equation have at least
one failed entity. Thus no entity fail due to change in power
flow values.
Now consider there exist a solution to the densest
p−subhypergraph problem. Hence there exist a set of p vertices
V ′ that completely covers M hyper-edges. Failing the gener-
ator type entities corresponding to the vertices in V ′ would
thus fail at least M load entities at t + 1 according to the
instance construction. Thus a total of at least p +M entities
would fail which solves the KCoL problem. On the other way
round consider there exist a solution to the KCoL problem.
As reasoned earlier, a load entity cannot cause any induced
failure. Hence if a load entity is in the solution then it can be
substituted with any operational generator entity without loss
of correctness. Similarly, if a transmission line type entity is in
the solution it can be replaced by a generator type entity it is
connected to. Using this substitution a solution thus comprises
of entities G′ ⊂ G. All M (or greater than M ) entities that fail
due to the initial failure of p entities belongs to set L. Thus
the substituted solution (or original solution if no substitution
is required) would consist of generator type entities that cause
failure of these M (or greater than M ) load entities. Hence
selecting the vertices corresponding to G′ would ensure that
at least M hyper-edges are completely covered solving the
densest p−subhypergraph problem. Hence proved.
V. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM
Owing to the KCoL problem being NP-complete, we obtain
the optimal solution using an Mixed Integer Program (MIP).
However, as we require to compute the contingency list fast,
we devise a polynomial time heuristic that provides a sub-
optimal solution to the problem.
A. Optimal Solution using Mixed Integer Program
As a reference frame, we consider that the initial failure
occurs at time step t = 0. It is shown in Section III-C that
the number of time steps in the cascade is upper bounded by
|E| − 1. We devise a Mixed Integer Program that solves the
KCoL problem optimally for a power network P (E,B,C0, F )
(the abstraction constructed for t = 0). Irrespective of whether
the steady state is reached before or at time step |E| − 1, in
our MIP we try to maximize the number of entities failed at
t = |E| − 1 when K entities fail at t = 0. Moreover, it can
not be predicted when the cascading failure stops. Hence, the
MIP is bound to check for solution to compute the maximum
number of entities that can fail till the maximum possible time
step, i.e. |E| − 1. Firstly, the list of variables used in the MIP
formulation are discussed—
• Variable List 1: For each entity ei ∈ E a variable set
xi,t,∀t, 0 ≤ t ≤ |E| − 1 are created. The value of xi,t
is 0 if the entity is operational at time step t and 1
otherwise.
• Variable List 2: For each entity ei ∈ E a variable set
yi,t,∀t, 0 ≤ t ≤ |E| − 1 is created. From the set C0
we can get the initial instantaneous power value ei,c,0
of an entity ei. The value of yi,0 is set to ei,c,0. All the
instantaneous values are real thus comprising the set of
non integer variables in the program.
Using these definitions and the list of variables created, the
objective of the MIP is provided in 4 and the constraints of
the MIP are formally described.
max
|E|−1∑
i=1
xi|E2| (4)
Subjected to:
Constraint Set 1:
∑|E|
i=1 xi,0 = K. This constraint sets the
number of entities failed at time step t = 0 to K.
Constraint Set 2: xi,d ≥ xi,t−1,∀t, 1 ≤ t ≤ |E| − 1. This
ensures that an entity that is not operational at time step t = d
would remain non-operational in all times step t > d.
Constraint Set 3: Consider an IDR of form ei ← ea ·eb+ec ·ed.
To capture the cascading failure process, a set of constraints
is developed and described below —
Step 1: New variables are introduced to represent the minterms.
In this example, two new variables cab and ccd are created to
represent the terms ea · eb and ec · ed. This is equivalent of
adding two new IDRs cab ← ea · eb and ccd ← ec · ed with the
transformed IDR being ei ← cab + ccd.
Step 2: A linear constraint is developed for the c type variables
to capture the failure propagation. For an IDR cab ← ea · eb,
the constraint is represented as cab,t ≤ xa,t−1+xb,t−1,∀t, 1 ≤
t ≤ |E|−1. This captures the condition that cab,t is equal to 1
only if at least one of the entities ea or eb is non operational.
Step 3: For each transformed IDR a linear constraint is intro-
duced. For an IDR ei ← cab+ccd the constraint is represented
as N × xi,t ≤ cab,t−1) + ccd,t−1,∀t, 1 ≤ t ≤ |E| − 1. Here N
is the number of minterms in the IDR (in this example N = 2).
Constraint Set 4: For a given load bus entity el, the constraint
yl,t = 0,∀t, 0 ≤ t ≤ |E| − 1 is added denoting that the
instantaneous power demand of all the load bus remain
constant at each time step. Similarly, for a given neutral bus
entity en, the constraint yn,t = 0,∀t, 0 ≤ t ≤ |E|−1 is added.
Constraint Set 5: For a given generator bus entity
ep and transmission line entity eq , the constraints
xp,t ≤ yp,t+1ep,u ,∀t, 1 ≤ t ≤ |E| − 1 and
xq,t ≤ yq,t+1eq,u ,∀t, 1 ≤ t ≤ |E| − 1 are added. As this
is a maximization problem, the x type variable of the
corresponding generator/transmission line entity would be
set to 1 when it operates beyond its rated upper bound. The
constraints ya,t ≥ 0 and ya,t ≤ ea,u + 1 are added at all time
steps for each generator or transmission line type entity ea.
This limits the maximum value of these entities to its upper
bound plus one and them failing only if their instantaneous
power value is just above the upper bound.
Constraint Set 6: To capture the power flow equations
in equations 1-3 the following constraints are
developed. Consider the equation
∑
em∈Oel em,c,t =
7∑
en∈Iel en,c,t − el,c,t. Naively, this can be constructed
as a non-linear constraint
∑
em∈Oel (1 − xm,t) × ym,t =∑
en∈Iel (1 − xn,t) × yn,t − (1 − xl,t)yl,t+1. The constraint
denotes that the instantaneous flow values of the transmission
lines/load demand are taken into consideration if the the
load bus is operational at the next time step (as failure due
to IDR is reflected after 1 unit of time). This constraint
can be linearized as
∑
em∈Oel (ym,t − xm,t × em,u) =∑
en∈Iel (yn,t − xn,t × en,u) − (yl,t − xl,t+1el,u). If
a transmission line en fails at time instant t then its
instantaneous power value is set to its upper bound
(owing to constraint set 5). This would equate the term
(yn,t − xn,t × en,u) corresponding to this transmission line
to 0. If the transmission line en is operational then xn,t = 0
and hence (yn,t − xn,t × en,u) would equate to yn,t−1 thus
being considered in the power flow equation. Similarly if the
load bus is not operational the value of (yl,t − xl,t+1el,u) is
set to 0. These constraints are constructed for all time steps
0 ≤ t ≤ |E| − 2 and similar constraints are generated for
equations 1 and 3 as well.
Constraint Set 7:For each transmission line type entity ea ∈ E
flowing out power from a bus type entity eb the constraint
xa,t ≤ xb,t is added for each time step 1 ≤ t ≤ |E| − 1. This
captures the condition that if a bus type entity fails then all
transmission lines to which it transmits power also fails.
It is to be noted that there won’t be any infeasibility in
solution arising due to the constraints. The load and neu-
tral buses can only be made non-operational through their
dependency equations. Whereas, the transmission lines and
generators can be only made non-operational through change
in power flow/generation values (as they don’t have any
dependency equations). The objective in (4) along with these
set of constraints, finds the the set of K entities whose initial
failure at t = 0 maximizes the number of entities failed at the
end of cascading process. As this is a maximization problem
the power flow and generation at each time step is set to values
that maximizes the total number of entities failing at the steady
state. Hence the MIP captures the notion of WCCP.
B. Heuristic Solution
In this section we design a sub-optimal heuristic that finds
a solution to the KCoL problem in polynomial time. Primarily
we use the following two definitions that drive the heuristic.
Definition: Kill Set: For an entity ej ∈ E in an power network
P (E,B,Ct, F ), the Kill Set is denoted as KS(ej). This set
comprises of all the entities made non-operational including
the entity itself at the end of the cascading process when entity
ej is made non-operational initially.
Definition: Fractional Minterm Hit Value: For an entity ej ∈
E in an power network P (E,B,Ct, F ) the Fractional Minterm
Hit Value is denoted as FMHV (ej). It is calculated as
FMHV (ej) =
∑m
i=1
ci
|si| where m are the minterms and
for a given minterm mi, ci are the number of entities that
belong to Kill(ej) and |si| is its size. This metric provides
an estimate of impact of other operational entities that can be
made non-operational at future time steps if the entity ej is
made non-operational.
Algorithm 2: Heuristic Solution to KoCL problem
Data: An power network P (E,C0, F ) at time t = 0 and an
integer K.
Result: A set of initially failing entities E′ ⊂ E and |E′| ≤ K
1 begin
2 Initialize D ← ∅ E′ ← ∅ and KH ← 0;
3 while KH < K do
4 Update KH ← KH + 1;
5 For each entity ei ∈ E\D compute the kill set Cei ;
6 For each entity ei ∈ E\D compute FMHV (ei);
7 Let ej be the entity having highest |Cej | ;
8 if There exists multiple entities having highest
cardinality Kill Set then
9 Let ep be an entity having highest FMHV (ep)
with ep in the set of entities having highest
cardinality Kill Set;
10 If there is a tie choose arbitrarily;
11 Update E′ ← E′ ∪ {ep}, D ← D ∪ Cep ;
12 Update all dependencies in F by removing entities
in the left and right side of the IDRs that belong
to Cep ;
13 else
14 Update E′ ← E′ ∪ {ej}, D ← D ∪ Cxj ;
15 Update all dependencies in F by removing entities
in the left and right side of the IDRs that belong
to Cep ;
16 return E′ ;
Algorithm 2 returns a sub-optimal value of E′ which when
failed initially would greedily maximize (based on Kill Set and
FMHV) the number of entities failed at the end of the cascade.
The algorithm runs in O(n3) where n = |E|. It is to be note
that the greedy failure maximization is done based on IDR. To
get the actual number of entities failed when the set of entities
E′ fail initially we use the MIP. Essentially, we modify the
constraint 1 such that only entities in E′ fail at t = 0 and see
the number of entites failed at the final time step. This gives
us a measure to compare the efficacy of the heuristic solution
with respect to the MIP.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We analyzed the run time performance and quality of the
heuristic solution with respect to MIP for different bus systems.
The quality of the solution is defined by the number of
components reported to be non-operational for a given value of
K. Specifically we used the 9, 14, 24, 30, 39, 57, 118, 145, 300
and 2383 Winter Polish bus systems available in MATPOWER.
For a given bus system, we used the MATPOWER AC power
solver. Using the data, the abstract power network P (E,C0, F )
was generated. On the constructed power network the MIP
and heuristic solutions were executed. The implementation
was done in Java and a student licensed version of IBM
CPLEX optimizer was used to solve the MIP. A UNIX
system with 8 GB of RAM and intel i5 processor was used
for the execution. All the implementation along with data
sets are made open source. The repository can be found in
https://github.com/jbanerje1989/ContingencyList.
In Table II, a comparison between the MIP and the heuris-
tic solution with respect to the number of entities in non-
operational state for different bus systems with K varied from
1 to 5 in steps of 1 are provided. Additionally, the total number
8K values and number of entities dead in MIP and heuristic
DataSet Number of 1 2 3 4 5
Entities MIP Heu MIP Heu MIP Heu MIP Heu MIP Heu
9 bus 24 15 15 19 19 24 24 24 24 24 24
14 bus 44 29 29 32 31 36 35 42 41 44 43
24 bus 80 48 48 51 51 54 54 58 58 61 61
30 bus 83 54 54 58 58 64 63 71 70 74 73
39 bus 105 63 63 70 70 74 74 79 78 84 82
57 bus 149 96 96 113 108 128 119 136 128 140 136
118 bus 405 240 240 245 245 250 250 255 254 260 260
145 bus 666 499 499 511 511 517 516 522 517 527 523
300 bus 847 493 491 506 506 513 513 524 524 531 530
2383wp bus 5923 3249 3249 3296 3278 3326 3308 3354 3332 3382 3353
TABLE II: Quality of solution comparison of Mixed Integer Program and Heuristic for different Power Network bus systems and varying K
K values and running time in sec for MIP and in ms for Heuristic
DataSet IDR Generation 1 2 3 4 5
Time (ms) MIP Heu MIP Heu MIP Heu MIP Heu MIP Heu
9 bus 0.31 0.026 2 0.13 1 0.02 1 0.02 1 0.01 1
14 bus 0.34 0.09 2 0.14 1 0.08 1 0.05 1 0.04 1
24 bus 0.60 0.27 4 0.16 4 0.19 6 0.18 3 0.27 3
30 bus 0.55 0.24 5 0.20 5 0.17 6 0.16 3 0.18 4
39 bus 0.62 0.30 8 0.17 14 0.28 6 0.28 7 0.25 5
57 bus 0.76 1.44 17 0.65 13 0.60 15 0.74 15 0.60 17
118 bus 1.49 1.78 33 1.09 52 1.16 64 0.73 33 1.02 41
145 bus 2.22 10.48 60 9.45 83 9.49 91 10.26 147 12.72 76
300 bus 2.09 11.09 146 4.23 249 4.68 364 3.63 253 4.34 293
2383wp bus 7.66 315 5 220 7 225 11 218 14 262 18
TABLE III: Run time comparison of Mixed Integer Program and Heuristic for different Power Network bus systems and varying K
of entities (buses and transmission lines) for each bus system
is mentioned. It is to be noted that the total number of entities
and the number of entities in non-operational state include
the entities constructed for generator buses with non-zero load
demand (as mentioned in Section III-B). Table III reports the
IDR generation time for each bus system along with the time
taken to execute the MIP and heuristic for different values
of K. Some insightful observations from the results are as
follows — (a) The heuristic solution performs very nearly
to that of MIP with respect to quality and have an almost
same performance for K = 1. (b) For almost all the cases, the
maximum percent difference in the number of non operational
entities in heuristic with respect to MIP is under 1% with
a maximum percent difference of 7% for 57 bus system at
K = 3. (c) It is observed that more than 50% of the total
entities in a given bus system will be non-operational if K = 1.
This implies that the power system are extremely vulnerable
even if a single entity is attacked, (d) For almost all the bus
systems from 9 to 300 the heuristic finds a solution to the KCol
problem nearly 100 times faster than the MIP, (e) for the 2383
Winter Polish bus system the heuristic is 10 to 20 times faster.
However, it is be noted that the comparison is done based on a
serialized implementation of the heuristic. There exists scope
to parallelize the heuristic to achieve even faster run time.
Hence, it can be reasonably argued that the Heuristic solves
the KCol problem achieving near optimal solution at a much
faster time compared to MIP. Thus the abstraction provided by
the MIIR model along with the Heuristic solution can be used
by a Power Network operator to obtain the K Contingency
List at any given time and make appropriate control decisions.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce the MIIR model to capture de-
pendencies and analysis of cascading failure in power network.
We used the model to solve the K Contingency list problem
that finds a set of K entities which when made non-operational
at a certain time step would cause the maximum number of
entities to fail at the end of cascading process. As the problem
is NP-complete we devise a MIP to obtain the optimal solution
and a polynomial time sub-optimal heuristic. The time and
quality performance of the heuristic with respect to the MIP
are compared for different bus systems and it is shown that the
heuristic outperforms the MIP with respect to running time and
additionally produces near optimal solution.
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